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Empirical findings from 1980 to 1995 show that China, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have 
different economic growth models than that of United States. For example, one experiment indicates that the 
trade effect on growth is significantly different between China and U.S. The fact that each country has 
different dominant determinants of growth supports the notion that they have different economic growth 
models. Higher secondary level enrollment and terms of trade deterioration enhances growth of U.S, with the 
secondary level enrollment as the biggest factor. Whereas Japan has higher secondary level enrollment and 
lower inflation rate as key growth factors, predominantly the secondary level enrollment. Growth of China is 
stimulated by higher saving rate, lower inflation rate, and terms of trade improvement, but the saving rate 
plays the biggest role. Higher life expectancy and saving rate mostly explain growth of Singapore, especially 
the life expectancy. At last, higher government consumption ratio and lower life expectancy equally explains 




At the height of Asian economic crisis in 1997, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
arrived on the scene in Indonesia to approve a $10 billion bailout package that tied to 
economic reform measures. The reform required budget cut, tight credit, high interest rates, 
and bank closings; in order to lower inflation, end weakening currency, and stop foreign 
exchange loss. These solutions were similar to the countries that IMF typically faced, but 
the problems were very different. The government of those countries spent beyond its 
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means, and financed the budget deficits by printing money through its central bank. The 
results were high inflation, weakening currency, and loss of foreign exchange reserve. 
In contrary, Indonesia had budget surplus, inflation was low, and foreign exchange 
reserves were stable. Instead of restoring public confidence, the IMF remedies caused bank 
panic and economic meltdown. The closure of 16 insolvent banks in November 1997 set 
off $2 billion withdrawal from two third of all the country’s bank. The tight monetary and 
fiscal policies deprived businesses from bank loans and government funds that were 
necessary to avoid mass unemployment and bankruptcies. The whole economy eventually 
shrank by 13.7 percent in 1998, from an averaged 7 percent growth in previous 25 years. 
This economic blunder1 raises the following key question. Does each country at 
different development stage, with different social choices, and different economic 
structure, respond similarly to reform policies to promote economic growth? In other 
words, does each country with different social and economic characters have a similar 
economic growth model? If the answer is yes, policy makers should shape their economic 
policies according to their condition, and international agencies, such as IMF and World 
Bank, should formulate reform strategies accordingly. 
We attempt to answer the above question by comparing economic growth models 
of four distinctive countries against the United States (U.S.). If they indeed have different 
economic growth models, what are key determinants of their corresponding economic 
growths? We select these countries because of their distinctive characteristics. 
                                                 
1 The author does not imply that IMF worsened the crisis, but they could have done better during the early 
stage of the crisis. 
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United States has the largest real GDP ($9 trillion2) and also one of the highest real 
GDP per capita ($ 33,000) in the world. It has total population that ranks fourth globally 
(276 million), close to Indonesia’s, and total area of 9.4 million km2 that matches China’s. 
Japan’s real GDP ($2.8 trillion) is one third of US’s and half of China’s. But it has real 
GDP per capita ($22,000) that is almost six times higher than China’s, and not far behind 
from US’s and Singapore’s. Its total population of 127 million people, almost half of US’s, 
lives in only 378 thousand km 2  of total area, a twenty five times smaller than US’s. China 
is the most populous country in the world (1.3 billion) and occupies a total area (9.6 
million km2) that is similar in size to US’s. Its real GDP ($4.9 trillion) is half of US’s, but 
the people earn only $3,847 per capita, ten times less than that of US’s. Singapore has a 
small economy with $101 million real GDP, but a rich economy with $24,000 per capita. It 
also has a small population (4.2 million) and a very small total area (633 km2). Indonesia 
is almost a total opposite of Singapore. It is the fifth most populous country with 225 
million populations that live in 2 million km2 of total area. It has a bigger economy than 
Singapore’s with $598 million of real GDP, but a poorer economy with $2,662 per capita, 
almost ten times less than Singapore’s. 
The second section of this paper discusses economic growth theories, Neoclassical 
and Endogenous, and how does this paper fit into these theories. It also describes how does 
it differ from other empirical works in economic growth. The third section explains the 
data that is used in the analysis and defines each dependent and independent variables. The 
fourth section developed a pooled regression model to test if there is a significant different 
between each country’s growth model against the US’. If they are significantly different, 
                                                 
2 All statistics in this paragraph are in year 2000 (source: CountryWatch.com) 
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we will discuss key determinants of their growths that explain the differences. The fifth 
section discusses the empirical findings and policy implications, and the sixth section 
draws conclusion from this research and suggests potential further research. 
II. Economic Growth theories 
A. Neoclassical 
In the late 1950’s and the 1960’s, economic growth theory is mainly the 
neoclassical growth theory developed by Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Cass (1965), and 
Koopmans (1965). The theory focuses on capital accumulation and its link to savings 
decisions and population growth. It says that increase in the savings rate raises output 
growth rate in the short run, but not in the long run. In the long run, economy will reach a 
steady state where per capita output is not growing anymore or constant. The key 
assumption here is diminishing marginal product of capital. And it applies to population 
growth factor as well. Increase in the population growth rate raises an aggregate output 
growth rate, but reduces level of output per capita. The theory implies that country with a 
lower initial income per capita will eventually catch-up or converge with those of higher 
income per capita as long as they have equal savings rate, population growth, and 
technology. The paper does not concern with this absolute convergence property of the 
theory, but instead it uses the savings rate and population growth variables to explain the 
output per capita growth rate of each country. 
Neoclassical implies that only technological progress affects per capita output in 
the long run. But it does not explain what are determinants of the technological progress. 
The technological part is exogenous (i.e. Solow residual), and endogenous growth theory 
focuses on the determinants of that part. 
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B. Endogenous 
Starting from late 1980s, endogenous becomes a focus of growth theory 
development with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The theory looks at how societal 
choices affect the technological progress. Specifically, they look at human capital and 
more recently social-political institutions. The assumption of the theory, contrarily with 
neoclassical, is a constant marginal product of capital. This means that the technology 
increases the productivity of capital and labor which allows output per capita to grow 
endlessly. Therefore countries with lower income per capita will converge with those of 
higher income per capita only if their determinants of technological progress (i.e. human 
capital and social-political institutions) are the same. The paper again does not concern 
with this conditional convergence property of the theory. Instead it uses the human capital 
and the institution variables to explain the output per capita growth rate of each country. 
Many empirical studies in endogeneous growth, namely Barro (1991), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992), Barro (1996), perform a cross section analysis across various 
countries and mainly concern with conditional convergence issue. Whereas this paper 
performs a pooled regression analysis that combines thirty years time series with five cross 
sectional countries (as dummy variables), and only concerns with comparison of growth 
models. But it uses some of Barro’s endogenous variables for our growth model. Equation 
(1) is an example of Barro’s growth equation in a complete form (see Barro 1996). 
Per Capita growth rate = log (initial GDP) + initial male secondary and higher schooling + log(initial life 
expectancy) + log(initial GDP)*male schooling + log(fertility rate) + government consumption ratio + rule-
of-law index + terms-of-trade change + democracy index + democracy index squared + inflation rate + Sub 
Saharan Africa dummy + Latin America dummy + East Asia dummy  ............................................... (1) 
Next section defines these variables, neoclassicals, and other variables, in more detail. 
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III. The Data Set 
The dependent variable for our growth equations is the annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita of each country from 1970 to 2000. The independent variables are based 
on neoclassical and endogenous theories, with four country-dummy variables to identify 
the country of each time series data. 
The neoclassical variables are savings rate and population growth rate, explaining 
the capital and labor factor of production function respectively. The endogenous variables 
can be classified into government institutions, trade (open-economy), and human capital 
related3. Government institution variables are government consumption ratio to GDP for 
fiscal policy choice, and inflation rate for monetary policy choice. The trade variable is 
annual change of export to import ratio, primarily for countries with smaller domestic 
market thus more dependent on international trading. Human capital variables are gross 
secondary enrollment ratio for educational measure, and life expectancy at birth for health 
measure. The four country-dummy variables will be discussed in next section. See 
Appendix A for variables descriptions and data sources. 
We compile most data from a single source, that is IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
Year Book, for data consistency to allow cross-country comparison. The exception to this 
are gross secondary enrollment ratio and life expectancy at birth (see Appendix A for their 
sources). Furthermore, China4 dataset are practically not available annually before 1980. 
Appendix B lists data that are available for our analysis using method that is discussed in 
the next section. 
                                                 
3 We omitted law and political institution variables (see Barro, 1996) from our model due to time and budget 
constraint. 
4 China in this paper refers only to Mainland China, excluding Hong Kong and Macao. 
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IV. The Model 
In order to compare growth model of our distinctive countries, we pool about 150 
observations (30 time series observations for five countries) to estimate a pooled 
regression using four dummy variables. This method enables us to combine many time 
series observation with few cross-sectional observations into a single common regression, 
to improve precision of estimated parameters due to higher degree of freedom. The 
common growth equation is shown below: 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingY 6543211 ββββββ +−−−+=  
HealthEducation 87 ββ ++  
11211109 εββββ +++++ IndonesiaSingaporeChinaJapan  ....................... (2) 
Note that we are treating U.S. as the base country for others to compare with. 
Therefore, 1β  is the base intercept for U.S. and 9β , 10β , 11β , and 12β  are differential 
intercepts for Japan, China, Singapore, and Indonesia respectively. After running 
regression (2), we can determine if the differential intercepts are statistically significant 
individually, or/and simultaneously. For example, a statistically significant 12β  means that 
the intercept value of Indonesia’s growth model is different from that of U.S.’ growth 
model. Overall, we will perform five separate zero hypothesis testing, 9β = 0, 10β = 0,  
11β = 0, 12β = 0, and a simultaneous 9β = 10β = 11β = 12β = 0. 
Due to data deficiency of life expectancy, secondary enrollment, and China, as 
previously mentioned, we will conduct the hypotheses testing for three regression 
equations. The first regression (equation 2) encompasses all variables, but only considers 
1980 to 1995 time series. Because China and life expectancy variable only have 1980 to 
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2000 data, and secondary enrollment variable has 1980 to 1995 data. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics for variables that are used for this regression. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Regression model with all variables (1980-1995) 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Real GDP per capita growth 80 -36.28 25.40 2.1199 11.2584 
Saving rate 80 16.60 48.50 31.1375 8.0717 
Population growth 80 -2.43 11.76 1.4514 1.4513 
Government consumption 80 7.83 21.16 12.6515 4.1677 
Inflation rate 80 -1.40 24.20 5.5813 4.9548 
Terms-of-trade change 80 -32.12 31.02 .6413 10.9362 
Secondary enrollment 80 29.00 103.40 69.1550 23.9502 
Life expectancy 80 53.42 80.10 71.2377 7.1076 
Japan dummy 80 0 1 .20 .40 
China dummy 80 0 1 .20 .40 
Singapore dummy 80 0 1 .20 .40 
Indonesia dummy 80 0 1 .20 .40 
 
The second regression excludes secondary enrollment and life expectancy 
variables, but considers a longer 1970 to 2000 time series with an exception of China that 
begins from year 1980. The second equation is shown below: 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingY 6543212 ββββββ +−−−+=  
21211109 εββββ +++++ IndonesiaSingaporeChinaJapan  ....................... (3) 
The reasons for having this regression are incompleteness and inconsistency of social 
indicators, in comparison to that of economic variables. For example, life expectancy data 
comes from different sources (consistency issue) and its earlier data are only available in 
five to ten years period (completeness issue). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for 
variables that are used for the second regression. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Regression model without social variables (1970-2000) 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Real GDP per capita growth 145 -52.89 25.40 1.9096 12.0098 
Saving rate 145 11.60 48.50 29.9695 8.6159 
Population growth 145 -2.43 11.76 1.4397 1.2575 
Government consumption 145 4.34 22.80 12.5034 4.3960 
Inflation rate 145 -3.09 57.60 6.6070 7.8054 
Terms-of-trade change 145 -32.12 64.27 1.3050 12.1366 
Japan dummy 145 0 1 .21 .41 
China dummy 145 0 1 .14 .35 
Singapore dummy 145 0 1 .21 .41 
Indonesia dummy 145 0 1 .21 .41 
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The third regression is similar to equation (2), in terms of using 1980 to 1995 time 
series, except that we perform additional hypothesis testing ( 0β = 0) to compare growth 
effects of terms of trade change between U.S. and China. If the differential slope 
coefficient ( 0β ) is significant, it means that their terms of trade change effects on growth 
are different. The third equation is shown below: 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingY 6543213 ββββββ +−−−+=  
HealthEducation 87 ββ ++  
IndonesiaSingaporeChinaJapan 1211109 ββββ ++++  
30 . εβ ++ TradeChina  ....................... (4) 
This equation also enhances the result of equation (2) because it considers both interrupt 
and slope differentials, although not all slope differentials from all possible combination of 
country-dummy and social-economic variables. We exclude other slope differentials to 
avoid lenghty interpretations later. Therefore this regression is experimental by this nature. 
We realize that our pooled regression method implicitly makes key assumptions 
regarding regression parameters and the stochastic error term. First, we assume that the 
parameters do not change over time (temporal stability) and do not differ between various 
cross-sectional countries (cross-sectional stability). We believe that having 15 years (1980-
1995) data in equation (2) and (4), and 30 years (1970-2000) data in equation (3) improve 
the temporal stability. We certainly solve part of the cross-sectional stability by having 
differential intercepts in our equations, but still allowing most differential slopes to be the 
same. In other words, we disregard complete interaction effects or interaction dummy 
among countries. Considering that having five countries will multiply the number of 
interaction dummy thus complicating our model and interpretation afterward. Second, we 
assume that error variances of the five countries’ growth equations are homoscedastic, and 
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the error in country A’s equation at time t is uncorrelated with that of country B at time t. 
These are the usual Ordinary Least Square properties that we assume to be true in our case. 
If we accept these assumptions and later find that differential intercepts are 
statistically significant in at least one of the equations, we can proceed to run five separate 
growth equations for each country, as stated below, using variables that resemble closely to 
those done by Barro (1996) in his cross-country growth study. Equation (5), (6), (7), (8), 
and (9) are growth equations for U.S., Japan, China, Singapore, and Indonesia respectively. 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingEconomy US 181716151413 )log()log( ββββββ +−−−+=
32019 )log()log( εββ +++ HealthEducation  ........................................................ (5) 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingEconomy JP 262524232221 )log()log( ββββββ +−−−+=
42827 )log()log( εββ +++ HealthEducation  ........................................................ (6) 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingEconomy CH 343332313029 )log()log( ββββββ +−−−+=
53635 )log()log( εββ +++ HealthEducation  ........................................................ (7) 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingEconomy SG 424140393837 )log()log( ββββββ +−−−+=
64443 )log()log( εββ +++ HealthEducation  ........................................................ (8) 
TradeInflationGovernmentPopulationSavingEconomy IN 504948474645 )log()log( ββββββ +−−−+=
75251 )log()log( εββ +++ HealthEducation  ........................................................ (9) 
Please note that “Economy” in above equations refers to real GDP per capita, and 
“Population refers to total population. Also note that we may drop some of the variables, 
with proper justifications, in the final growth equation of each country if they are highly 
correlated (multicollinearity). The final equation enables us to focus separately on 
significant key determinants of economic growth for each country, without presence of 
serial correlation. 
11 
For these country regression runs, we use two years period of data since annual 
frequency will likely be affected by business-cycle effect. We realize that longer intervals, 
such as five or ten years, are probably more effective to smooth out the cyclical effect. But 
since we have only 20 years dataset for China, and we need at least 10 cases to assess the 
significance of the result, we have to settle on 2-years period. 
V. Empirical Results 
Table 3 shows results from regressions that use equation (2), (3), and (4). 
Regression (2) results indicate that Japan, China, Singapore, or/and Indonesia’s differential 
intercept(s) is statistically different, individually or simultaneously, from that of U.S. 
Table 3: Economic Growth Regression (2), (3), and (4) Comparison 
Variable Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) 




































China.Trade   -.459 
(-2.197) 
(.031) 
Number of observations 80 145 80 
Adj. R-square .220 .127 .262 
F-stat. 3.363 (.001) 3.330 (.001) 3.334 (.001) 
Note: Regression (2) and (4) with all variables (1980-1995), Regression (3) without social variables (1970-2000) 
 t-statistics in italic parenthesis, significance level in normal parenthesis 
Results from regression (3) are not significant enough in their coefficients and 
regression for our interpretation. This probably means that the social variables, education 
and health, may enhance the explanation of the economic growth, because regression (2) 
with social variables has a lower adjusted R-square (.127). The higher number of 
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observations in regression (3) does not help its significant either. This is probably due to 
higher business cycles effect from more frequent observation. 
China.Trade coefficient is significant at 3% level, which means that China’s trade 
variable is different from that of United States in affecting growth. US’ terms of trade have 
not improved since 1991, but it can afford to do so because of its huge domestic economy. 
On the other side, China has to depend more on his export to spur growth. This extra 
variable in equation (4) slightly improves equation (2) as can bee seen from a higher 
adjusted R-square (.262). Based on the results of regression (2) and (4), we can say that 
Japan, China, Singapore, and Indonesia seem to have different economic growth models 
than that of United States. If this is the case, the next question is what are key determinants 
that may explain differences of their growth models. 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix among Economic Growth Regressors for United States, Japan, China, 
Singapore, and Indonesia (only significant high correlations are shown) 
  Population Government Inflation Trade Education Health 
Saving USA       
  Japan -.876 -.747 .782  -.791 -.866 
  China .702  .636  .742  
  Singapore -.650    -.592  
  Indonesia .651    .710 .690 
Population USA  -.892 -.600  .889 .974 
  Japan  .607 -.759  .913 .993 
  China  -.796   .907 .865 
  Singapore  -.582   .645 .952 
  Indonesia  -.544   .975 .969 
Government USA     -.714 -.869 
  Japan     .644 .619 
  China     -.666 -.644 
  Singapore      -.507 
  Indonesia       
Inflation USA     -.532 -.503 
  Japan     -.660 -.746 
  China       
  Singapore       
  Indonesia    .737   
Trade USA       
  Japan       
  China       
  Singapore     .704  
  Indonesia       
Education USA      .923 
  Japan      .939 
  China      .705 
  Singapore      .581 
  Indonesia      .951 
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Before we discuss those determinants, we detect if any of those variables are highly 
correlated. For example, Table 4 shows that health and education variables of U.S. are 
highly correlated. Therefore we drop one of the variables such that it optimizes the 
significant of coefficients and the regression, and the adjusted R-square. For U.S. final 
equation, we drop saving, population, government, inflation, and health. It does not mean 
that these variables are not determinants of U.S. growth. It merely says that education and 
trade seem to play a more significant role in its growth during 1970-2000. The same logic 
applies to other countries as well. The Durbin-Watson statistics suggest no strong evidence 
of serial correlation. Therefore we are comfortable to present the remaining variables as 
significant key determinants of growth for respective countries as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Economic Growth Regression Results of United States, Japan, China, Singapore, and Indonesia 
Log(real GDP per capita) United States Japan China Singapore Indonesia 
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(4.162) 
(.001) 






















   













1.505 1.131 1.666 2.183 1.579 
Number of observations 
 











Note: t-statistics in italic parenthesis, significance level in normal parenthesis 
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1. Saving Rate 
In the neoclassical model for a closed economy, the saving rate is equal to the ratio 
of investment to output. This should justify our use of gross capital formation ratio to GDP 
as a proxy to saving rate. We learn from the previous discussion of neoclassical that saving 
rate may not affect long-run growth rate without exogenous technological factor. 
Empirically, Blomstrom, Lipsey, Zejan (1993) and Barro (1996) reach the following 
conclusion regarding investment and growth. They find that their relations are reverse 
causation, meaning that an investment decision in a particular economy relate to its growth 
opportunity. Barro (1996) concludes this after finding that the estimated coefficient of the 
investment variable is statistically significant only if he use a more recent, compared to the 
previous five years, investment ratio. Table 5 shows that saving rates are significant 
growth factors for China and Singapore. For a one percent increase in saving rate, the real 
GDP per capita grows on average at 11.1 percent for China, and 1.6 percent for 
Singapore. Because China has a lower current level of per capita output than that of 
Singapore, capital accumulation in China has a higher marginal product. Whereas 
Singapore probably experiences diminishing marginal product of capital, as predicted by 
neoclassical theory. 
2. Population Growth 
As population grow, more capitals are required for additional labor, instead of 
increasing capital per labor. This is why we should expect that a higher population growth 
rate has a negative effect on economic output per capita based on neoclassical theory. We 
use log of population growth rate rather than log of fertility rate in Barro (1996) because of 
data adequacy issue. Barro attributes a significant negative coefficient of the fertility rate to 
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the increased resources that must be devoted to child rearing, rather than to production of 
goods (see Becker and Barro, 1988). None of our countries have population growth rates 
as significant growth factors, because they are highly (and positively) correlated to 
education and health factors (see Table 4). This means that as population grows, 
secondary enrollment ratio and life expectancy increases as well, assuming that total 
spending in education and health grow at the same time. 
3. Government Consumption 
Our use of government consumption ratio to GDP to measure government spending 
is intended to approximate the size of government in relative to economy. Big government 
means higher non-productive (government) spending, and its associated taxation, because 
it “crowds out” higher return (more productive) private spending. Therefore we should 
expect a negative effect of higher government consumption ratio on economic growth. 
Please note that Barro (1996) excludes education and defense spending in his government 
consumption variable. His estimated coefficient is negatively significant. Contrarily, we 
have a positive significant coefficient for Indonesia. Specifically, for a one percent 
increase in government consumption ratio, real GDP per capita of Indonesia increases on 
average by 24%. This probably means that private sector is not functioning well because of 
ineffectiveness rule of law and political instability. Inclusion of these factors should 
capture these effects separately. 
4. Inflation Rate 
The general view is that inflation is costly, whether it is the average rate of inflation 
or the variability and uncertainty of inflation. The reason is that businesses rely on stable 
and predictable inflation to perform properly. But how bad is inflation before it reduces 
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growth? Barro (1996) estimates that an increase in the average inflation rate by 10 
percentage points per year will lower the growth rate of real per capita GDP by 0.3-0.4 
percentage points per year. This means that the level of real GDP will be lowered after 30 
years by 6-9%. Therefore the magnitude of the effect is not that large and takes a longer 
term. We have a bigger magnitude effect than the one reported by Barro. Table 5 shows 
that for a one percent increase in inflation rate, real GDP per capita decreases on average 
by 2.9 percent for China and 4.9 percent for Japan. This bigger magnitude probably 
reflects business cycles effects due to shorter interval frequency of our observations. 
5. Terms of Trade 
Changes in terms of trade – measured as the ratio of export to import – has often 
been thought as important effect on developing countries, which has to rely on their 
exports in key products. But the improvement in this ratio does not always mean a positive 
impact on real GDP. We can see in the case of oil importing country that cuts production 
and employment due to increase in oil prices. Barro (1996) shows that change in terms of 
trade has a significant positive coefficient. But our results are mixed. This trade variable 
has a small positive impact (0.79%) on growth for China, but a small negative impact (-
0.97%) for U.S. We interpret this as China is more dependent on trade for growth than U.S. 
6. Secondary Enrollment 
This education variable is an important part of human capital, especially in 
industrialized countries. In fact, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) report that the share of 
human capital factor is about one third of production function in those countries. Although 
this factor is a more difficult element to measure precisely, Barro (1996) manages to use 
average years of schooling at the secondary and higher level for males aged 25 and over as 
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a proxy for human capital. Since this data is only available at 5 years period, we have to 
use gross enrollment ratio for secondary level regardless of age and sex. This is a better 
explanatory variable than a lower level, e.g. primary, education according to Barro. His 
result shows a significantly positive effect on growth from the years of schooling that 
apply across 100 countries. Specifically, an extra year of male upper-level schooling is 
estimated to raise growth rate by a substantial 1.2 percentage points per year. Our results 
show that both U.S. and Japan have education variable as key determinants of growth. 
Specifically, for a one percent increase in secondary enrollment ratio, real GDP per 
capita increases on average by 1.6 percent for U.S., and 7.4% for Japan. As developed 
countries, U.S. and Japan have to rely more on human capital and less on physical capital 
and raw labor to spur growth. 
7. Life Expectancy 
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Startz (1998) mention that health factor is probably a 
major contributor to human capital in poor countries. We should be able to support this 
view from our findings in Table 5. But first the cross-country result by Barro (1996) shows 
that the log of life expectancy at birth5 has a significantly positive effect on growth. He 
interprets this result by broadly proxying life expectancy to the quality of human capital. 
Our results are mixed in this case. Human clearly has a strong positive impact on growth 
for Singapore, but a negative impact for Indonesia. For a one percent increase in life 
expectancy at birth, real GDP per capita increases by 9.8 percent for Singapore, but 
decreases by 2.6 percent for Indonesia. Major improvement in health status of Singapore 
has coincided with their substantial increments of economic growth. But a health upgrade 
                                                 
5 Barro reports a similar result for infant mortality rate, instead of life expectancy, as a proxy for health. 
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in Indonesia, without a proportionate upgrade in education, seems to create a social burden 
that suppresses its growth. 
In addition to these seven variables, we would like readers to consider these 
differences as well to explain distinctive growth between U.S. and the other four countries: 
initial GDP level, rule-of-law effectiveness, political freedom, and religion. Country with a 
lower initial GDP level tends to grow at a higher rate, assuming other explanatory 
variables are held constant (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). One of these omitted 
explanatory variables that worths mentioning is infrastructure investment. Country without 
proper infrastructure in place (i.e. Afghanistan) will have stalled growth rate irrespective of 
its initial GDP level. Discussions of law, political, and religion factors are beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead, we will focus on the findings of our seven variables. 
Different key determinants of growth for U.S., Japan, China, Singapore, and 
Indonesia provide some explanation of why growth models of the last four countries are 
different from that of U.S. This result should alert policy makers that no common growth 
policy could be fitted to a particular country. Differences in the seven explanatory 
variables have to be considered as well. Particularly for U.S. and Japan, education should 
be on the top of their agendas. For China, Singapore, and Indonesia, policy makers should 
give priorities to saving, health, and law-political correspondingly. 
VI. Conclusion 
Empirical findings from 1980 to 1995 suggest that economies of China, Japan, 
Singapore, and Indonesia grow differently than that of United States. The social indicators, 
education and health, explain some of these differences. One small experiment shows that 
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the trade effect on growth is different between China and U.S. But looking at each 
economy separately, we find that each has different key determinants of growth. 
Higher secondary level enrollment and terms of trade deterioration enhances 
growth of U.S. Whereas Japan has higher secondary level enrollment and lower inflation 
rate as key growth factors. Growth of China is stimulated by higher saving rate, lower 
inflation rate, and terms of trade improvement. Higher life expectancy and saving rate 
mostly explain growth of Singapore. But lower life expectancy and higher government 
spending ratio correlates to increased growth of Indonesia. Overall, increased secondary 
level enrollment is a key growth determinant of U.S. and Japan. Higher saving rate is an 
important growth factor of China. Improved life expectancy highly coincides with the 
growth of Singapore. Higher government consumption ratio and lower life expectancy 
equally explains the growth of Indonesia. 
The challenge of time series growth regression for few countries is to overcome 
business cycle effect by having higher interval frequencies observations. But some 
developing countries, such as China, have only about 20 years of data. Future research will 
enable a more accurate analysis using five or ten years of more observations. Other 
possible growth research can be taken by incorporating additional social and political 
institution factors, such as rule of law (see Barro, 1996), democracy (see Barro, 1999), and 
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Appendix A: Variables Description and Sources 
Economy: Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Current GDP in local 
currency are deflated at 1995 constant price, and then converted to IMF’s SDR currency6, 
before divided by total population. Source: International Financial Statistics Year Book, 
1999-2001, IMF. 
Saving: Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. Sources: International 
Financial Statistics Year Book, 1999-2001, IMF, and The World Bank Group, World 
Development Indicators database. 
Population: Annual population growth rate. Sources: International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1999-2001, IMF, and The World Bank Group, World Development 
Indicators database. 
Government: Government consumption as a percentage of GDP. Sources: 
International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1999-2001, IMF, and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). 
Inflation: Annual change of consumer price index. Sources: International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1999-2001, IMF; The World Bank Group, World Development 
Indicators database; and San Jose State University, Economics Dept., Dr. Watkins (China, 
1979-1986). 
Trade: Annual change of terms of trade, that is export (fob) to import (cif) ratio. 
The trade data are based on custom data. Source: International Financial Statistics Year 
Book, 1999-2001, IMF. 
                                                 
6 SDR or Special Drawing Rights is determined using a basket of currencies (US$, Euro, Yen, Pound). 
Weights are assigned to the currencies to reflect their relative importance in world’s trading and financial 
systems. 
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Education: Gross secondary enrollment ratio, that is total enrollment in secondary 
level, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population 
corresponding to secondary level. Sources: UNESCO online database. 
Health: life expectancy at birth in years. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
International Data Base; National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics 
Report, Vol. 47, No. 28, Dec 13, 1999; Berkeley Mortality Database (Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, Statistics and Information Department); and The World Bank Group, World 
Development Indicators database. 
Japan: A Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the data belong to Japan, or 0 
otherwise. 
China: A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the data belong to Mainland 
China only, excludes Hong Kong and Macao, or 0 otherwise. 
Singapore: A Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the data belong to 
Singapore, or 0 otherwise. 
Indonesia: A Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the data belong to 
Indonesia, or 0 otherwise. 
Note: If all dummy variables take zero value, the data belong to United States. 
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Appendix B: Data available for regressions 
Year Economy Saving Population Government Inflation Trade Education Health Japan China Singapore Indonesia 
 Growth rate % rate % Growth % % of GDP rate % Change % 
Enrollment 
ratio % Years Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy 
1970 -4.91 17.40 1.17 22.80 5.90 3.79 83.70 70.80 0 0 0 0 
1971 -6.04 18.50 1.27 22.24 4.30 -10.48  71.10 0 0 0 0 
1972 4.37 19.50 1.08 21.78 3.30 -7.22  71.20 0 0 0 0 
1973 -5.95 20.30 0.96 20.78 6.20 15.76  71.40 0 0 0 0 
1974 -2.73 19.50 0.92 21.48 11.00 -7.31  72.00 0 0 0 0 
1975 3.14 17.00 0.99 22.08 9.10 14.64 84.40 72.60 0 0 0 0 
1976 5.39 18.70 0.96 21.08 5.70 -14.26  72.90 0 0 0 0 
1977 -0.97 20.20 1.01 20.44 6.50 -12.88  73.30 0 0 0 0 
1978 -2.73 21.40 1.07 19.84 7.60 2.09  73.50 0 0 0 0 
1979 0.93 21.60 1.11 19.62 11.30 6.97  73.90 0 0 0 0 
1980 1.99 19.70 1.20 20.38 13.50 4.67 91.20 73.70 0 0 0 0 
1981 11.05 20.60 0.96 20.16 10.30 -0.51 94.40 74.10 0 0 0 0 
1982 2.49 18.20 0.97 21.00 6.20 -2.76 94.60 74.50 0 0 0 0 
1983 8.88 18.20 0.92 20.82 3.20 -10.27 96.90 74.60 0 0 0 0 
1984 13.59 20.80 0.88 20.36 4.30 -15.13 96.10 74.70 0 0 0 0 
1985 -8.15 19.70 0.90 20.85 3.60 -3.99 97.30 74.70 0 0 0 0 
1986 -8.03 19.20 0.92 21.16 1.90 -4.29 97.70 74.70 0 0 0 0 
1987 -11.64 19.90 0.90 21.04 3.70 0.76 96.65 74.90 0 0 0 0 
1988 8.81 19.00 0.91 20.30 4.00 17.19 94.55 74.90 0 0 0 0 
1989 5.04 19.10 0.93 20.04 4.80 5.19 93.50 75.10 0 0 0 0 
1990 -6.98 18.00 1.06 20.36 5.40 3.15 93.10 75.40 0 0 0 0 
1991 -2.05 16.60 1.08 20.64 4.20 8.97 94.50 75.50 0 0 0 0 
1992 6.08 16.90 1.08 20.11 3.00 -2.47 97.30 75.80 0 0 0 0 
1993 1.62 17.40 1.06 19.47 3.00 -4.80 98.50 75.75 0 0 0 0 
1994 -3.06 18.50 0.98 18.82 2.60 -3.43 97.30 75.70 0 0 0 0 
1995 -0.07 18.30 0.94 18.54 2.80 1.99 97.40 75.79 0 0 0 0 
1996 6.13 18.70 0.92 18.20 2.90 0.24  76.12 0 0 0 0 
1997 9.99 19.40 0.96 17.84 2.30 0.74  76.51 0 0 0 0 
1998 -0.97 20.20 0.95 17.46 1.60 -5.71  76.70 0 0 0 0 
1999 5.87 20.30 0.95 17.61 2.20 -8.25  76.98 0 0 0 0 
2000 7.62 21.40 3.04 17.50 3.40 -6.28  77.12 0 0 0 0 
1970 8.02 39.00 1.13 7.44 7.70 -3.88 86.60 72.00 1 0 0 0 
1971 7.72 35.80 1.30 7.96 6.40 18.98  72.94 1 0 0 0 
1972 11.32 35.50 1.41 8.16 4.90 0.14  73.54 1 0 0 0 
1973 3.40 38.10 1.42 8.30 11.70 -20.89  73.79 1 0 0 0 
1974 -10.69 37.30 1.33 9.12 23.10 -7.14  74.41 1 0 0 0 
1975 4.41 32.80 1.28 10.04 11.80 7.74 91.80 75.08 1 0 0 0 
1976 8.99 31.80 1.08 9.86 9.40 7.51  75.48 1 0 0 0 
1977 21.68 30.80 0.97 9.83 8.20 9.59  75.93 1 0 0 0 
1978 19.72 30.90 0.91 9.66 4.10 8.12  76.09 1 0 0 0 
1979 -16.30 32.50 0.84 9.70 3.80 -24.20  76.42 1 0 0 0 
1980 25.40 32.20 0.81 9.81 7.80 -0.89 93.20 76.20 1 0 0 0 
1981 4.09 31.10 0.73 9.92 4.90 14.86 93.50 76.54 1 0 0 0 
1982 1.14 29.90 0.70 9.90 2.70 -0.76 93.10 77.06 1 0 0 0 
1983 8.71 28.10 0.70 9.94 1.90 10.45 92.40 77.10 1 0 0 0 
1984 2.28 28.00 0.65 9.80 2.20 7.21 93.10 77.51 1 0 0 0 
1985 16.67 28.20 0.63 9.58 2.00 8.95 95.40 77.80 1 0 0 0 
1986 15.50 27.70 0.54 9.65 0.60 21.70 96.20 78.23 1 0 0 0 
1987 15.12 28.50 0.49 9.43 0.10 -7.32 96.60 78.65 1 0 0 0 
1988 9.44 30.40 0.40 9.14 0.70 -7.70 96.80 78.40 1 0 0 0 
1989 -6.35 31.30 0.40 9.07 2.30 -7.59 96.40 78.84 1 0 0 0 
1990 2.99 32.30 0.33 9.02 3.10 -6.46 97.10 79.07 1 0 0 0 
1991 10.34 32.20 0.39 9.02 3.30 8.71 96.40 79.39 1 0 0 0 
1992 5.10 30.80 0.37 9.18 1.70 9.71 95.70 79.47 1 0 0 0 
1993 11.63 29.70 0.33 9.42 1.30 2.88 98.90 79.63 1 0 0 0 
1994 5.97 28.70 0.28 9.54 0.70 -3.79 99.60 80.10 1 0 0 0 
1995 -3.60 28.60 0.23 9.81 -0.10 -8.54 103.40 79.96 1 0 0 0 
1996 -3.99 30.00 0.23 9.68 0.10 -10.79  80.21 1 0 0 0 
1997 -3.72 28.60 0.25 9.72 1.70 5.59  80.33 1 0 0 0 
1998 4.35 26.30 0.27 10.17 0.60 11.30  80.45 1 0 0 0 
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Year Economy Saving Population Government Inflation Trade Education Health Japan China Singapore Indonesia 
 Growth rate % rate % Growth % % of GDP rate % Change % 
Enrollment 
ratio % Years Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy 
1999 12.07 26.11 0.08 10.29 -0.30 -2.58  80.57 1 0 0 0 
2000 -2.89 25.90 0.28 16.60 -0.60 -6.27  80.70 1 0 0 0 
1970   2.88   -20.11 24.30 61.70 0 1 0 0 
1971   2.70   29.13   0 1 0 0 
1972   2.29   -0.91   0 1 0 0 
1973   2.33   -12.90  63.29 0 1 0 0 
1974   1.85   -19.14  63.29 0 1 0 0 
1975   1.72   6.33 46.20 63.29 0 1 0 0 
1976   1.41   7.46   0 1 0 0 
1977   1.33   0.92   0 1 0 0 
1978   1.36 13.24  -14.99  67.30 0 1 0 0 
1979  36.20 1.33 15.07 2.00 -2.55   0 1 0 0 
1980 6.48 34.90 2.12 14.48 6.00 4.14 45.90 67.00 0 1 0 0 
1981 -0.79 32.30 1.23 14.38 2.40 10.14 39.40 67.80 0 1 0 0 
1982 2.42 32.10 1.21 14.03 1.90 15.78 36.20 68.15 0 1 0 0 
1983 10.82 33.00 1.86 13.79 1.50 -10.22 35.70 68.50 0 1 0 0 
1984 -14.47 34.50 1.47 14.24 2.80 -8.22 37.40 68.85 0 1 0 0 
1985 -10.85 38.50 1.45 13.47 8.80 -32.12 39.70 69.20 0 1 0 0 
1986 -17.05 38.00 1.54 13.49 6.00 11.41 42.50 69.33 0 1 0 0 
1987 -5.48 36.70 1.61 12.64 7.20 26.53 44.80 69.46 0 1 0 0 
1988 15.41 37.40 1.60 11.75 18.70 -5.79 45.60 68.98 0 1 0 0 
1989 -17.21 37.00 1.54 12.35 18.30 3.33 46.10 68.50 0 1 0 0 
1990 -14.50 35.20 1.41 12.29 3.10 31.02 48.70 68.37 0 1 0 0 
1991 3.08 35.30 1.28 13.30 3.50 -3.15 51.80 68.67 0 1 0 0 
1992 10.92 37.30 1.15 13.50 6.30 -6.50 55.00 68.97 0 1 0 0 
1993 11.55 43.50 1.08 13.04 14.60 -16.28 56.80 69.27 0 1 0 0 
1994 -27.98 41.30 1.04 12.82 24.20 18.58 61.00 69.58 0 1 0 0 
1995 9.17 40.80 0.97 11.44 16.90 10.14 65.80 69.90 0 1 0 0 
1996 12.40 39.30 0.98 11.49 8.30 -5.58 68.90 70.19 0 1 0 0 
1997 15.11 38.00 0.95 11.65 2.80 18.19 70.10 70.48 0 1 0 0 
1998 2.39 38.10 0.92 11.88 -0.80 1.74  70.78 0 1 0 0 
1999 8.89 38.30 0.88 12.95 -1.40 -10.04  71.08 0 1 0 0 
2000 14.32 37.93 -0.45 13.09 0.30 2.72  71.38 0 1 0 0 
1970 9.85 38.70 1.47 11.94 0.50 -16.88 46.00 65.80 0 0 1 0 
1971 7.96 40.20 1.93 12.62 1.80 -1.73   0 0 1 0 
1972 14.50 41.10 1.90 12.14 2.10 3.91   0 0 1 0 
1973 11.75 39.20 1.86 10.96 19.60 10.50   0 0 1 0 
1974 10.58 44.60 1.83 10.35 22.40 -2.69   0 0 1 0 
1975 -0.17 37.60 1.35 10.64 2.50 -4.66 51.90 67.55 0 0 1 0 
1976 8.38 40.80 1.33 10.52 -1.80 9.82   0 0 1 0 
1977 6.26 36.20 1.75 10.70 3.20 8.42   0 0 1 0 
1978 8.47 39.00 0.86 11.02 4.90 -1.41   0 0 1 0 
1979 7.03 43.40 1.28 9.91 4.10 3.97   0 0 1 0 
1980 15.35 46.30 1.26 9.75 8.50 0.04 59.90 71.63 0 0 1 0 
1981 21.35 46.30 1.24 9.51 8.20 -5.78 52.60 71.80 0 0 1 0 
1982 8.20 47.90 1.23 10.93 3.90 -2.95 54.10 72.22 0 0 1 0 
1983 15.71 47.90 -2.43 10.88 1.20 5.06 56.80 72.29 0 0 1 0 
1984 11.58 48.50 1.24 10.82 2.60 8.29 59.00 72.85 0 0 1 0 
1985 -10.64 42.50 1.64 14.26 0.50 3.36 62.00 73.52 0 0 1 0 
1986 -12.43 37.50 1.61 13.42 -1.40 1.60 67.20 74.18 0 0 1 0 
1987 -0.40 37.90 1.19 12.37 0.50 -0.08 68.90 74.35 0 0 1 0 
1988 8.11 34.20 11.76 10.52 1.50 1.71 69.90 74.46 0 0 1 0 
1989 12.18 35.00 2.81 10.33 2.30 0.37 69.90 74.57 0 0 1 0 
1990 6.05 36.60 3.07 10.20 3.50 -3.53 68.10 76.04 0 0 1 0 
1991 11.48 34.80 2.32 9.94 3.40 2.82 67.40 76.88 0 0 1 0 
1992 6.70 36.40 2.91 9.33 2.30 -1.42 67.40 77.09 0 0 1 0 
1993 12.62 37.90 2.52 9.37 2.30 -1.27 67.30 77.62 0 0 1 0 
1994 11.96 33.50 3.07 8.44 3.10 8.61 72.00 77.86 0 0 1 0 
1995 5.99 34.60 3.27 8.57 1.70 0.72 73.40 77.96 0 0 1 0 
1996 7.93 37.10 4.03 9.48 1.40 0.21 74.10 78.67 0 0 1 0 
1997 -6.86 38.90 3.60 9.54 2.00 -0.85  79.66 0 0 1 0 
1998 -6.09 34.20 3.48 10.16 -0.30 11.20  79.79 0 0 1 0 
1999 7.12 32.44 0.52 9.70 -3.09 -1.60  79.92 0 0 1 0 
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Year Economy Saving Population Government Inflation Trade Education Health Japan China Singapore Indonesia 
 Growth rate % rate % Growth % % of GDP rate % Change % 
Enrollment 
ratio % Years Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy 
2000 8.23 31.30 3.34 10.45 1.40 -0.77  80.05 0 0 1 0 
1970 -10.28 13.60 2.58 8.77 12.30 1.13 16.10 38.65 0 0 0 1 
1971 -12.38 15.80 2.56 9.29 4.40 1.17  38.65 0 0 0 1 
1972 5.05 18.80 2.54 9.07 6.50 1.69   0 0 0 1 
1973 -0.91 17.90 2.52 10.60 31.00 3.43  45.55 0 0 0 1 
1974 3.38 16.80 2.48 7.85 40.60 64.27   0 0 0 1 
1975 6.66 20.30 2.78 9.92 19.10 -22.97 20.00  0 0 0 1 
1976 9.57 20.70 -1.58 10.29 19.90 1.19  50.52 0 0 0 1 
1977 1.33 20.10 2.32 10.93 11.00 15.63   0 0 0 1 
1978 -34.79 20.50 2.32 11.69 8.10 -0.10   0 0 0 1 
1979 2.82 20.90 2.32 11.66 16.30 24.39   0 0 0 1 
1980 9.75 20.90 3.11 10.32 18.00 -6.59 29.00 53.42 0 0 0 1 
1981 12.43 29.80 2.59 11.10 12.20 -6.24 31.10 54.12 0 0 0 1 
1982 -1.97 27.90 2.21 11.57 9.50 -30.15 34.50 54.84 0 0 0 1 
1983 -25.23 28.70 2.21 10.41 11.80 -2.36 36.50 55.57 0 0 0 1 
1984 3.60 26.20 2.21 10.15 10.50 21.93 39.00 56.32 0 0 0 1 
1985 -14.43 28.10 1.89 11.25 4.70 14.91 41.30 56.71 0 0 0 1 
1986 -36.28 28.20 2.26 10.99 5.80 -23.76 46.40 57.11 0 0 0 1 
1987 -11.89 31.30 2.17 9.43 9.30 0.29 48.20 57.51 0 0 0 1 
1988 4.07 31.50 2.08 8.98 8.00 4.71 48.10 58.70 0 0 0 1 
1989 3.99 35.10 2.02 9.39 6.40 -6.62 45.60 59.94 0 0 0 1 
1990 -6.58 36.10 0.19 8.99 7.80 -13.20 44.00 61.22 0 0 0 1 
1991 0.44 35.50 1.06 9.13 9.40 -4.19 43.50 62.55 0 0 0 1 
1992 5.25 35.80 1.71 9.52 7.50 10.53 43.50 63.93 0 0 0 1 
1993 2.50 29.50 1.68 9.02 9.70 4.40 44.90 65.36 0 0 0 1 
1994 -4.57 31.10 1.65 8.11 8.50 -3.65 48.20 65.81 0 0 0 1 
1995 -0.82 31.90 2.13 7.83 9.40 -10.74 51.50 66.27 0 0 0 1 
1996 6.79 30.70 1.06 7.57 8.00 3.81 55.70 66.60 0 0 0 1 
1997 -43.66 31.80 1.55 6.84 6.70 10.46  66.93 0 0 0 1 
1998 -52.89 35.30 2.28 4.34 57.60 39.40  67.27 0 0 0 1 
1999 13.74 11.60 2.37 6.56 20.50 13.46  67.61 0 0 0 1 
2000 -18.41 17.90 0.59 7.03 3.70 -8.57  67.96 0 0 0 1 
 
  
